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"Trust Me, I'm a Judge": Why Binding
Judicial Notice of Jurisdictional Facts
Violates the Right to Jury Trial
William M. Carter,Jr.*
"[T]he Constitution does not trustjudges to make

determinationsofcriminalguilt. '
I. INTRODUCTION

The conventional model of criminal trials holds that the prosecution is
required to prove every element of the offense beyond the jury's reasonable
doubt. The American criminal justice system is premised on the right of the
accused to have all facts relevant to his guilt or innocence decided by a jury of
his peers. The role of the judge is seen as limited to deciding issues of law and
facilitating the jury's fact-finding. Despite these principles, judges are reluctant
to submit to the jury elements of the offense that the judge perceives to be
routine, uncontroversial or uncontested.
One such element is found in federal criminal statutes that require proof that
the offense occurred within the federal government's "special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction."2 Judges routinely decide this jurisdictional element
themselves, presumably believing that it would be a waste of time to submit such
a picayune issue to the jury, given that federal jurisdiction over land simply does
not feel like other "substantive" elements of the offense. Thus, where the federal
offense of kidnapping is charged, for example, the court may remove from the
jury the issue of whether the kidnapping occurred within an area subject to
federal jurisdiction, despite the fact that the statute explicitly makes this an
element of the offense. This seems to be a valid, common-sense judgment until
one realizes that the mere denomination of land as "federal" does not necessarily
fulfill the jurisdictional element of the offense. Federal military bases, for
example, may contain land that does not meet the constitutional and statutory
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1. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 32 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
2. This jurisdiction is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). It is also referred to as
"federal legislative jurisdiction" and this Article will use the terms "federal legislative
jurisdiction" and "special and territorial jurisdiction of the United States"
interchangeably.
*
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requirements for federal jurisdiction, either because of procedural defects at the
time of acquisition or because jurisdiction was subsequently ceded?
Judges have traditionally been permitted to decide a limited class of factual
issues themselves, even in criminal cases. By incorporating the common law
mechanism of judicial notice into Federal Rule of Evidence 201,' Congress
intended that federal judges, in the interest of efficiency, be permitted to resolve
certain generally known or readily ascertainable facts themselves instead of
submitting such issues to the jury. Congress, however, also placed an important
limitation on judicial notice in criminal cases. Rule 201(g) provides that "[i]n
a criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to,
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed." Federal courts, therefore, may
take judicial notice in criminal cases, but must instruct the jury that they are free
to disregard the court's judicial notice and find the matter not proven. While this
limitation may be somewhat inelegant, given that a judge must submit facts to
the jury in a criminal case that she could decide herself in a civil case, it is
required if judicial notice is to be permitted in criminal cases. Without such a
limitation, federal courts could effectively direct verdicts in favor of the
prosecution, which is clearly prohibited by the Sixth Amendment.
While the Federal Rules, in theory, adequately protect the right to jury trial,
federal courts in practice routinely issue partial directed verdicts in favor of the
prosecution on the jurisdictional element of federal offenses. This trend toward
diminishing the jury's role with regard to jurisdictional elements of federal
crimes is in substantial tension with the Supreme Court's recent reinvigoration
of the jury's role in the sentencing context.' This Article contends that the

3. In United States v. Williams, 17 M.J. 207 (C.M.A. 1984) ("Williams II"),
(discussed in detail in Part IV infra), for example, the court found that the United States
had never acquired exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over almost 50,000 acres of Fort
Hood. Id. at 214.
4. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 provides:
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs onlyjudicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the
jury to accept as conclusive any factj udicially noticed. In a criminal case, the
court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as
conclusive any fact judicially noticed.
5. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,609 (2002) (applying Append in invalidating
Arizona's capital punishment scheme, under which thejudge could decide facts leading
to imposition of the death penalty, although the maximum authorized bythejury's verdict
was life imprisonment); Append v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000) (holding that
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predominant practice of federal courts of completely removing the jurisdictional
element from the jury violates the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial and
Rule 201.
Part II of this Article discusses the problems raised by binding judicial
notice of the jurisdictional element of federal criminal offenses. Part III gives an
overview of the factual, constitutional, and statutory prerequisites for land to fall
within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Part IV briefly
describes the circumstances in which courts may properly take judicial notice
under Rule 201. Part V discusses the requirements for judicial notice in criminal
cases and the legislative history and purpose of Rule 201(g). Part VI examines
selected criminal cases regarding judicial notice ofjurisdictional facts. Part VII
examines Supreme Court precedent on the proper division between the judge and
the jury in criminal trials and explains why appellate courts should not apply the
harmless error standard of review where the trial court has effectively directed
a verdict in favor of the prosecution. I conclude in Part VIII by providing a
proposal whereby federal courts can respect the Sixth Amendment and Rule
201 (g) while still attending to the practicalities of real-world criminal litigation.
Id. PROBLEMS RAISED BY REMOVING THE JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT
FROM THE JURY

Many federal criminal statutes require proof that the crime occurred within
the "special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States."6 Some
any fact, other than a prior conviction, which raises the sentence above the statutory
maximum must be alleged in the indictment and proved beyond the jury's reasonable
doubt).
6. For federal criminal offenses requiring proof of this element, see 15 U.S.C. §
1175 (2000) (manufacture of gambling devices), 15 U.S.C. § 1243 (2000) (possession,
sale or manufacture of switchblade knives), 15 U.S.C. § 1245 (2000) (possession or use
of ballistic knives), 18 U.S.C. § 81 (2000) (arson), 18 U.S.C. § 113 (2000) (assault), 18
U.S.C. § 114 (2000) (maiming), 18 U.S.C. § 661 (2000) (theft), 18 U.S.C. § 662 (2000)
(possession of stolen property), 18 U.S.C. § 1I11 (2000) (murder), 18 U.S.C. § 1112
(2000) (manslaughter), 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000) (attempted murder or manslaughter), 18
U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (kidnapping), 18 U.S.C. § 1363 (2000) (malicious harm to real or
personal property), 18 U.S.C. § 1460 (2000) (possession of obscene material), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2111 (2000) (robbery), 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000) (motor vehicle theft), 18 U.S.C. §
2241 (2000) (aggravated sexual abuse), 18 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000) (sexual abuse), 18
U.S.C. § 2243 (2000) (sexual abuse of a minor), 18 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000) (abusive sexual
contact), 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000) (sexual exploitation of minors), 18 U.S.C. § 2252A
(2000) (child pornography), 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (2000) (domestic violence), 18 U.S.C. §
2261A (2000) (stalking), 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2000) (sale or receipt of stolen goods), 18
U.S.C. § 2318 (2000) (trafficking in counterfeit labels for music, movies or computer
programs) and 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (2000) (coercion or enticement of minors). Examples
of other federal statutes requiring proof of ajurisdictional element are 18 U.S.C. § 2113
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courts of appeals have upheld trial judges' instructions taking judicial notice of
this jurisdictional element, despite the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that
it need not accept such judicial notice as binding.' Many of these courts have
affirmed such instructions even where the prosecution did not present any
evidence-for consideration by the jury or the judge-proving this element of
the offense. Other reviewing courts, to the contrary, have held that binding
judicial notice of jurisdictional facts amounts to an unconstitutional directed
verdict in favor of the prosecution in violation of the defendant's right to
jury trial.'
The cases are not only in tension with each other, but also with recent
Supreme Court cases reinvigorating the role of the jury in criminal cases. The
practice of wholly removing the jurisdictional element of federal criminal
offenses from the jury's consideration is part of a broader judicial and legislative
trend. Criminal and civil juries are widely seen as bothersome, inefficient and
irrational. 9 The Supreme Court has recently stopped this trend with regard to

(2000) (proof of bank's FDIC-insured status as an element of bank robbery) and 18
U.S.C. § 2314 (2000) (requiring that the stolen merchandise be worth a certain amount
in U.S. dollars). Judicial notice of such jurisdictional elements, absent a Rule 201(g)
instruction, also violates the right to jury trial. "Special territorial jurisdiction" is the
focus of this Article because first, it requires a more complicated and fact-bound inquiry
than other jurisdictional elements, thus providing a clear illustration of the dangers of
judicial notice in criminal cases; and second, a large number of federal criminal statutes
rely on this element to convert traditionally state crimes into federal offenses.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, No. 00-4150, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23827, at
*12 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000); United States v. Hemandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 810-11
(2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527, 530-31 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Piggie, 622 F.2d 486, 487-88 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lavender, 602
F.2d 639, 641 (4th Cir. 1979).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Dior, 671 F.2d 351,357-58 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Irvin, 21 M.J. 184,
186 (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. Williams, 17 M.J. 207, 215 (C.M.A. 1984)
("Williams II"). But see United States v. Blunt, 558 F.2d 1245, 1247 (6th Cir. 1977)
(stating in dicta that the trial court would have been justified in takingjudicial notice of
the jurisdictional element of the offense, despite the absence of any proof on the issue).
The First and Third Circuits have also stated (but not yet squarely held) that the right to
jurytrial is violated where the trial court takesjudicial notice of thejurisdictional element
of a federal offense without giving a Rule 201(g) instruction. See United States v. Bello,
194 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Thomas, 610 F.2d 1166, 1171 n.10 (3d
Cir. 1979).
9. See, e.g., Ricky J. Poole & Kimberly S. Keller, Jury Erosion: The Effects of
Robinson, Havner, & Gammill on the Role ofTexas Juries,32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 383,38586 (2001) (noting the diminishment the jury's role via courts' determinations of expert
witnesses' reliability); Mike Reck, Note, A Community With No Conscience: The
FurtherReduction ofa Jury'sRight to Nullify in People v. Sanchez, 21 WHrTTIER L. REV.
285 (1999) (discussing cases holding that thej ury may be specifically instructed that they
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sentencing determinations. In Apprendi v. New Jersey ° and Ring v. Arizona,"
the Court held that any fact increasing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum,
even if it is labeled a "sentencing factor," must be alleged in the indictment and
proved beyond the jury's reasonable doubt. 2 Apprendi and Ring, in holding that
these facts must be found by the jury, reasoned that the Framers would have
considered these factors the functional equivalent of an element of an aggravated
crime. 3 A fortiori, then, the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, as
elaborated upon in Apprendi and Ring, requires that the jury must find all facts
necessary to prove the statutorily defined elements of the offense. While the
Court has refused to extend Apprendi's specific holding beyond cases involving
sentencing factors that increase the sentence above the statutory maximum, 14 it
is difficult to see how Apprendi's reasoning could not apply to factual
determinations establishing that the defendant can be punished at all. Absent a
jury determination of a statutorily defined element of the offense, the level of
punishment authorized by the jury's verdict is zero.
The Sixth Amendment permits criminal defendants to decide whether to
proceed before a judge or a jury. There is no doubt that the judge is more wellversed in the law and may be more likely to reach an "accurate" result than the
jury. It may also be efficient to permit judges to make certain routine factual
determinations, such as federal jurisdiction. A defendant may choose to proceed
before ajury, however, believing that the jury's common sense evaluation of the
facts will inure to his benefit. Whether the defendant's choice is the "best" is
immaterial as a constitutional matter, because the Constitution delegates this
choice exclusively to him.'" It is for this reason the Supreme Court has held that
the Constitution prohibits a judge from directing a verdict of guilty, no matter

cannot nullify). The trend toward statutory damages caps is perhaps the best-known
example of diminished jury power in the civil context.
10. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
i1. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
12. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
13. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 584 (Scalia, J. & Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he
fundamental meaning of thejury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts
essential to the imposition of the level of punishment the defendant receives-whether
the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must
be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.").
14. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 568 (2002) (holding that Apprendi
does not apply where the judge, rather than the jury, decides facts triggering mandatory
minimum sentencing).
15. The Supreme Court has recently reiterated criminal defendants' unfettered right
to have this choice respected by the judicial system. Ring, 536 U.S. at 587 (rejecting the
state's argument that judicial factfinding of aggravating factors "may be a better way to
guarantee against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty" because "[t]he Sixth
Amendmentj ury trial right does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency
of potential factfinders").
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how overwhelming the evidence against the defendant. The Court has held that
even uncontested' 6 facts may not be removed from the jury's consideration.' 7
A judge's decision to remove any element of the offense from the jury's
consideration is inconsistent with this constitutional framework. Whether the
directed verdict is whole or partial does not change the fact that the court has
infringed upon the defendant's right to jury trial, because that right permits him
to choose to have all elements of the offense decided by the jury. This analysis
also is not dependent upon whether the element is labeled "substantive" (e.g.,
whether the defendant acted with malice in a murder prosecution) or
"procedural" (e.g., whether the defendant committed the crime in a place subject
to federal jurisdiction). As long as the matter is functionally an element of the
offense, the Sixth Amendment presumptively requires that a jury have the
last word.
Binding judicial notice of federal jurisdiction over the location of the
offense raises other troublesome issues. First, it risks disrupting the division of
prosecutorial authority between the federal and state governments. 8 While
federal criminal prosecutions are increasing, 9 crimes in the United States are
predominately prosecuted by the states.2" The constitutional division of law

16. "Uncontested" is a misnomer in a criminal trial unless the defendant pleads
guilty or stipulates to certain facts. See United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 320 (6th
Cir. 1988) ("A plea of not guilty places all issues in dispute, 'even the most patent
truths."') (quoting Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435, 440 (5th Cir. 1961)). The
Supreme Court, in its recent harmless error cases, has encouraged the tendency of courts
to implicitly shift the burden of proof to the defendant, by holding that a key element of
the harmless error analysis is whether the defendant attempted to contest the element the
government failed to prove at trial. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16-20
(1999). This sort of backdoor burden-shifting undermines the constitutional requirement
that the government actually prove every element of its case. See infra Part VII.B
(discussing Neder).
17. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S.564, 572-73 (1977).
18. I believe that the Supreme Court's fairly recent over-solicitousness toward
states' rights is misplaced and constitutionally unsound, particularly in the area of federal
civil rights law, given the history demonstrating that civil rights issues are indeed issues
of national concern. However, where defendants are swept into the federal criminal
system, I believe, unremarkably, that the link to federal jurisdiction must actually be
proven and found by ajury beyond a reasonable doubt.
19. See

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 1999: WITH
TRENDS
1982-99, NCJ 186180, at 1 (2001), available at

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fccp99.pdf. The report notes, inter alia, the
following: (1) between 1994 and 1999, investigations initiated by U.S. Attorneys have
increased 18.9 percent, and (2) there was a twenty-eight percent increase between 1994
and 1999 in criminal charges filed in U.S. district courts.
20. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 551 (2000) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that in 1998, federal prosecutions were about 0.4 percent of total
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enforcement authority between the federal and state governments implies that
only crimes directly impacting the federal government, or those otherwise of
national concern, are to be prosecuted in federal court.2" The significance of
federal legislative jurisdiction as an element of federal criminal offenses is
illustrated by the scope of the Assimilative Crimes Act,22 which makes it a
federal crime to commit any act within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States that would be a crime in the state where the act
occurred. 3 There is no doubt that the federal government may define and punish
crimes within the scope of its enumerated or implied powers. In the context of
crimes requiring proof of federal jurisdiction over the location of the offense, the
source of that power is quite simple: the federal government must be
constitutionally able to proscribe and prosecute crimes on land that it owns or
controls. Rendering this jurisdictional link a nullity implies an unlimited federal
police power not mentioned or implied in the Constitution. It creates a federal
offense without proof of the "federal" portion of the crime. Regardless of where
one stands on the increasing "federalization" of criminal law,24 federal courts
must at least take seriously the jurisdictional element of criminal offenses that,
but for the existence of that element, would otherwise be prosecuted by the state
in which they occurred.
Another concern is the increased possibility of error when courts make
factual determinations outside of the normal adversary process. Because judicial
notice excuses the prosecution from presenting evidence of the facts judicially
noticed to the jury, courts should take judicial notice in criminal cases only with
great caution. Determining whether the federal government enjoys jurisdiction
over land requires a complex inquiry with many subsidiary factual questions that
properly fall within the jury's province. When courts routinely misapply or
misunderstand the constitutional and evidentiary restrictions on judicial notice
in criminal cases, they are more likely to overlook the complexities of
determining whether the jurisdictional element exists in a particular case. Taking
judicial notice of this element in accordance with the letter of Rule 201 (b)(2) and
Rule 20 1(g) not only protects the defendant's right to jury trial in the abstract,

criminal prosecutions).
21. See United States v. Prentiss, 206 F.3d 960, 967 (10th Cir. 2000) ("Federal
criminal jurisdiction is limited by federalism concerns; states retain primary criminal
jurisdiction in our system."); cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995)
(federal gun-control act struck down because it was not shown that guns near schools had
any direct impact on interstate commerce). See also L.B. Schwartz, FederalCriminal
Jurisdictionand Prosecutors'Discretion,13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROns. 64, 65 (1948).
22. 18 U.S.C. § 13 (2000).
23. For an overview of the Assimilative Crimes Act, see Note, The Federal
Assimilative Crimes Act, 70 HARv. L. REv. 685 (1957).
24. See Steven D. Clymer, UnequalJustice: The Federalizationof CriminalLaw,
70 S. CAL. L. REv. 643, 645 n.3 (1997), for a good summary of the ongoing debate.
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but also requires the court to make an initial judgment about the reliability of the
sources purportedly demonstrating federal jurisdiction.
Additionally, there may be significant differences between federal and state
criminal systems in terms of procedure and punishment. Generally, compared
to state prosecution, defendants in the federal system may be subject to more
severe penalties, receive longer sentences, serve a greater portion of the sentence
imposed, more frequently be denied bail, have fewer opportunities for
suppression of evidence, and receive less pretrial discovery.2" Particularly
disturbing is the possibility of a death sentence where the federal government
prosecutes a crime that occurred in a non-death penalty jurisdiction.26 Given
such potential differences in outcome and procedure, courts should be highly
reluctant to remove the jurisdictional element from the jury.
Significant separation of powers issues are also raised when courts
disregard or manipulate Rule 2 01(g) because they believe the Rule is unsound
as a matter of policy. In exercising its constitutional power to create lower
federal courts, Congress has the power to prescribe rules of evidence and
procedure for those courts.27 Under basic separation of powers doctrine, a policy
argument against Rule 201 (g) should take place in the halls of Congress rather
than in the courtroom.
There are several factors that contribute to courts' willingness to remove the
jurisdictional element of the offense from the jury. First, many courts simply
misunderstand the rules governing when judicial notice may be taken at all and
further misunderstand when it is constitutionally permissible to take judicial
notice in a criminal case. Because courts believe federal legislative jurisdiction
(and, more generally, the jurisdictional element of federal criminal offenses) is
an easy and routine matter, there is also a powerful incentive not to expend time
and resources in presenting these "indisputable" facts to the jury. Moreover,
courts may fear that instructing the jury that it can disregard the court's judicial
notice may provide an excuse for the jury to nullify, under the pretense of
inadequacy of proof.28 Further, it is easy forjudges to believe that they are better

25. See Clymer, supra note 24, at 668-75.
26. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, CriminalMischief- The Federalizationof
American CriminalLaw, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1166-67 (1995).
27. See U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2074
(2000).
28. The debate about jury nullification is largely beyond the scope of this Article.
There are substantial arguments for why the potential for jury nullification is part of the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. See, e.g., Steven M. Warshawsky, Note, Opposing
Jury Nullification: Law, Policy,and ProsecutorialStrategy, 85 GEO. L.J. 191 (1996) (a
historical and contemporary analysis of the debate over of jury nullification).
Nonetheless, I tend to agree with Professor Turner, who has argued that it is extremely
unlikely that the jury would seize on the absence of proof on the esoteric jurisdictional
element of the offense as an excuse to nullify. It is more likely that the jury would simply
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suited than the jury to determine whether the complicated factual bases for
federal legislative jurisdiction have been proven.29
This Article acknowledges these disincentives to strictly following the Sixth
Amendment and Rule 201(g) when it comes to jurisdictional elements of federal
crimes. Courts may reasonably feel that requiring a jury determination of the
facts underlying the jurisdictional element is wasteful, particularly given the
increasing federal criminal caseload.3 ° Yet efficiency cannot be the only
concern, nor can it be allowed to trump the right to jury trial. It is possible to
strike a balance that adequately protects the right to jury trial without ignoring
efficiency concerns. A proper understanding of the Federal Rules of Evidence
and the accused's right to jury trial requires that judicial notice of federal
legislative jurisdiction is appropriate only when the following conditions are met:
(1) the court bases its judicial notice on sources of reasonably
unquestionable accuracy,3' presented by the prosecution in a
preliminary hearing limited to the jurisdictional issue;
(2) if the material presented at such a hearing raises any questions
about the existence of federal jurisdiction over the location of the
offense, the court cannot take judicial notice. Rather, the matter must
be resolved through the normal adversary process at trial, where the
prosecution must produce evidence proving this element of the offense
beyond the jury's reasonable doubt, and;

refuse to convict, despite the evidence. See Dennis J. Turner, Judicial Notice and
FederalRule of Evidence 201-A Rule Readyfor Change, 45 U. PITr. L. REV. 181, 199

(1983).
29. This last ground, of course, conflicts with the second, i.e., the perception that
the jurisdictional element is an "easy call." If the jurisdictional element of the offense
is readily determinable, then efficiency concerns should carry less weight, since the
matter could be sent to the jury at relatively little cost. On the other hand, if federal
jurisdiction is a complicated factual matter (as this Article contends), then Sixth
Amendment principles require that the jury resolve the question.
30. See supranote 19.
31. FED. R. EviD. 201(b)(2). The limitation that judicial notice of federal
legislative jurisdiction rest only on this prong of Rule 201(b), rather than on the
"generally known" prong of Rule 201(b)(l), is correct as a matter of the intent of those
provisions. Moreover, taking judicial notice under this Subsection requires the
government to actually produce the sources of reasonably unquestionable accuracy
required by Rule 201(b)(2) and therefore greatly lessens the risk that the court will
erroneously conclude that the jurisdictional element exists based solely on its own
assumptions about federal jurisdiction. See infra Parts IV.B & C for a discussion of the
differences between Rule 201 (b)(l) and 201 (b)(2).
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(3) if the material submitted at the hearing is such that the facts are
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,"32 the court may
take judicial notice. However, the court must explicitly33 and
separately 4 instruct the jury that it need not accept such judicial notice
as binding.35
This framework provides a reasonable balance between the judicial system's
interest in efficiency and the defendant's right to an actual jury determination of
all elements of the offense.36
32. FED. R. EvID. 201(b)(2).
33. I do not suggest that a court errs simply by failing to use Rule 201(g)'s precise
language. Rule 201(g) is satisfied as long as the instruction fairly states that the jury is
not required to accept the court's judicial notice as binding. See United States v.
Anderson, 528 F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
34. One rationale courts have offered for affirming convictions despite the trial
court's failure to give a Rule 201(g) instruction is that "the jury under the general
instructions was free to treat the matter [judicially noticed] as it would [any] other
evidence." United States v. Piggie, 622 F.2d 486, 489-90 (10th Cir. 1980); see
Anderson, 528 F.2d at 591; see also Brief of the United States in Opposition to Petition
for Certiorari at 2, 5, United States v. Lee, cert. denied, 532 U.S. 994 (2001) (No. 001030). In other words, the reasoning is that the general reasonable doubt instruction
adequately protects the defendant's right to jury trial. Although Rule 201(g) does not
explicitly require that the instruction specified therein be given separately, such a
requirement is implicit in the Rule. Rule 201(g) would be superfluous if Congress
believed that a general prefatory"reasonable doubt" instruction was sufficient, since such
an instruction is required in all criminal cases. Moreover, as a practical matter, a court's
general instruction at the beginning that all elements must be proven beyond a reasonable

doubt cannot erase thejury's later impression that a certain matter has been conclusively
decided by the court. Cf United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting
that the trial court "meticulously" complied with Rule 201(g) by issuing a separate
instruction that the jury was not required to accept the couIrt's judicial notice as binding,
in addition to "having instructed the jury generally on presumption of innocence and
burden of proof").
35. Specifically, courts should hold a limited hearing along the lines required by
the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Williams, 17 M.J. 207 (C.M.A. 1984)
("Williams II") (discussed in detail infra), wherein the prosecution is required to submit
proof establishing federal legislative jurisdiction. Failure to follow all of these
procedures should be grounds for automatic reversal on appeal and not subject to the
harmless or plain error standards, as discussed in Part VII.B infra. The appellate remedy
should be a new trial.
36. Taking this position to its logical extreme would appear to lead to the
conclusion that federal courts may take judicial notice of any element of a criminal
offense, even those that are clearly "substantive," as long as it gives a Rule 201(g)
instruction and holds a limited evidentiary hearing. This logical extension is limited,
however, by the fact that Rule 201 limits the types of facts subject to judicial notice.
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IH. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER LAND
The process of determining whether an offense occurred in an area subject
to federal jurisdiction can be quite complex. The term "special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction" is defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 7.37 The most common
basis for such jurisdiction is found in Subsection (3) of that Section, which
includes within the statutory definition:
Any lands reserved or acquired for the use of the United States, and
under the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction thereof, or any place
purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States by the consent
of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the
erection of a fort, magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful
building.3 " '
The statute therefore requires resolution of several discrete factual and legal
questions:
(1) Was the land at issue reserved, purchased or otherwise acquired for
the federal government's use?
(2) Did the legislature of the state where the property is located give
its consent to the acquisition?
(3) Was the purpose of the acquisition for the erection of a fort,
magazine, arsenal, dockyard, or other needful building?
Thus, the mere fact that the federal government owns or makes use of a parcel
of land is not sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction over that land.39

Most elements of criminal offenses would never meet the requirements of Rule 201
because, e.g., whether the defendant used force in sexually assaulting the victim would
never be "generally known" (Rule 201(b)(1)), nor "capable of accurate and ready
determination" (Rule 201 (b)(2)) by reference to sources such as maps, letters, legislation,
etc.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
38. Id. § 7(3).
39. The Supreme Court of Virginia (a state containing a large number of federal
installations) has also recognized the need for resolution of several discrete questions
before property can validly be determined to fall within federal legislative jurisdiction:
The question of whether a Federal area within a State is subject to exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States is complicated and often difficult to decide.
A determination depends upon many factors, jurisdiction being subject to the
terms, conditions, restrictions, limitations and provisions of the acquisition by
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Certain constitutional requirements must also be met for property to come
within the legislative jurisdiction of the United States. The Supreme Court has
held that exclusive or concurrent federal jurisdiction under the Constitution
requires the consent of the state where the property is located. Absent such
consent, possession by the United States is in the nature of an ordinary
proprietor." An ordinary proprietor, of course, has no constitutional basis to
exercise legislativejurisdiction (exclusive or otherwise) over the property; rather,
that right remains with the state in which the property is located. 4
Moreover, the procedures by which the federal government may acquire
property for its legislative jurisdiction have changed. For property acquired by
the United States prior to 1940, acceptance of the state's cession ofjurisdiction
was presumed absent evidence to the contrary. 2 As to property acquired after
1940, however, the state must have formally ceded jurisdiction and the federal
government must have formally accepted jurisdiction by filing a notice of
acceptance with the governor of the state or in another manner provided under
state law, in order for the property to become subject to federal legislative
jurisdiction. 43 Accordingly, in addition to the resolution of the geographic
question (whether the precise location of the crime is subject to federal
legislative jurisdiction) there is also a subsidiary temporal question, because the
date of federal acquisition determines the type of proof the government must
adduce regarding cession and acceptance of jurisdiction.
IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
Despite the complexities involved in determining whether the offense
occurred in an area within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
courts routinely take binding judicial notice of this element with little or no
analysis."4 Quite often, in addition to failing to conduct the analysis described
above for determining the existence of federal legislative jurisdiction over the
place of the crime, 45 and apart from considering the consequences of failing to
give a Rule 201(g) instruction in a criminal case," courts also more generally

the United States, including the consent of the State... and acceptance by the
United States.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 132 S.E.2d 407,
411 (Va. 1963) (internal citations omitted).
40. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 264 (1963) (citing James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1937)).
41. Id.
42. See Fort Leavenworth R.R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 528 (1885).
43. See 40 U.S.C. § 255 (2000); see also Paul,371 U.S. at 265.
44. See supra note 7.
45. See supra Part III.
46. See infra Part V.
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misunderstand when the Federal Rules of Evidence permit a court to take judicial
notice at all.
A. JudicialNotice Under FederalRule of Evidence 201
The concept of judicial notice is ancient at common law.47 Under Rule

201, federal courts can only take judicial notice of facts where those facts are not
subject to reasonable dispute because they are (1) generally known or (2) capable
of accurate and ready determination by reference to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.48 The drafters of Rule 201 intended that
judicial notice be the exception rather than the rule. "The usual method of
establishing adjudicative facts is through the introduction of evidence, ordinarily
consisting of testimony of the witnesses. If particular facts are outside the area
of reasonable controversy, this process is dispensed with as unnecessary. A high
degree of indisputability is an essential prerequisite."49
The mechanism ofjudicial notice applies a distinction between "legislative"
and "adjudicative" facts. Rule 201, by its terms, only applies to judicial notice
of adjudicative facts."0 Thus, if federal legislative jurisdiction is treated as an
issue of legislative rather than adjudicative fact, Rule 201 does not apply. The
traditional view broadly characterizes as "legislative" any facts that do not
change from case to case, such as geography.5' This categorical view would
always classify federal legislative jurisdiction as involving "legislative" facts

47. According to James BradleyThayer,judicial notice at common law is traceable
to two ancient legal maxims: manifesta non indigent probatione(that which is known
need not be proved) and non refertquid notum sitjudici,si notum non sit informajudicii
(it matters not what is known to a judge if it is not known in judicial form). JAMES
BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 277

(1898).
48. FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
49. United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir.1999) (quoting FED. R. EVID.
201 advisory committee's note).
50. FED. R. EvID. 201(a).
51. Much has been written on the theoretical distinction between "adjudicative"
and "legislative" facts. A leading administrative law treatise defines the distinction as
follows: "Whether 123 C Street is inside or outside the city is a question about 123 C
Street, not about a party. The question whether X lives in the city is a question of
adjudicative fact, but, even though X lives at 123 C Street, the fact that that address is
within the city is not an adjudicative fact." 2 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 10.6, at 155 (3d ed. 1994) (cited in United
States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802, 812 (2d Cir. 1995)). Similarly, the Second
Circuit has stated that "[l]egislative facts are established truths, facts or pronouncements
that do not change from case to case but apply universally, while adjudicative facts are
those developed in a particular case." Hernandez-Fundora,58 F.3d at 812 (quoting
United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 220 (8th Cir. 1976)).
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because the federal government's jurisdiction over a federal fort, for example,
presumably does not change from case to case. If Defendant A is convicted of
assault in a federal fort, the federal government presumably retains jurisdiction
over that fort in the case of Defendant B who commits an assault there two years
later. In other words, the existence of special territorial jurisdiction does not
change depending on the particular facts of Defendant B's case.
This analysis, however, is "dubious" at best.52 Under the traditional
distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts, a fact is adjudicative if it
answers who did what, where, how, when or with what intent." Whether the
federal government acquired legislative jurisdiction over the location of the
offense answers the question of "where" the crime occurred. As the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 201 explain, the better view of the
legislative/adjudicative facts distinction is a functional one:
Whether a fact is adjudicative or legislative depends not on the nature
of the fact--e.g., who owns the land-but rather on the use made of
it (i.e., whether it is a fact germane to what happened in the case or a
fact useful in formulating common law policy or interpreting a statute)
and the same fact can play either role depending on context.54
An example helps illustrate the logical flaws in treating federal jurisdiction
over land as a legislative fact. If a kidnapping occurred in an area near, but not
on, the recognized grounds of Fort Leavenworth, the precise location where the
defendant abducted the victim is clearly an adjudicative fact. Without resolving
this question, it cannot be determined whether the defendant committed the
federal offense of kidnapping, an element of which is that the kidnapping
occurred in an area within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United
States.55 This understanding also holds true if the kidnapping occurred on the
fort's recognized grounds. Even if it is undisputed that the offense occurred on
the grounds of Fort Leavenworth, at least three critical factual questions remain
unresolved: (1) whether the government ever validly acquired exclusive or
concurrent jurisdiction over the geographic area comprising Fort Leavenworth
in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and relevant statutes; (2) whether
the initial acquisition of Fort Leavenworth encompassed the particular area
where the offense occurred; and (3) even if it did, whether the federal
government subsequently ceded jurisdiction over all or part of the land. Thus,

52. 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5103, at 253 (Supp. 2003) (criticizing Hernandez-Fundora)(discussed in

Part IV.B infra).
53. See Turner, supra note 28, at 191.
54. Bello, 194 F.3d at 22.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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the question of whether the location of the offense at the time it was committed
was within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States is asked to
resolve "what happened in the case." It is a factual question, 6 the resolution
of
S7
which determines whether a federal or state crime was committed.
Most importantly, in the context of a criminal trial, formalistic labeling of
jurisdictional facts as "legislative" or "adjudicative" begs the Sixth Amendment
question. Formalistic reliance on the legislative/adjudicative facts distinction
reflects the same tendency toward treating labels as definitive that was rejected
by the Supreme Court in Apprendis' and Ring.59 Just as legislatures may not
remove the issue of racial motivation in a hate crime prosecution from the jury
merely by calling it a sentencing factor,6" courts also cannot eliminate the
jurisdictional element of an offense by labeling that element "legislative." The
Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee requires that any facts that are functionally
elements of the offense must be found by the jury and are therefore
"adjudicative."
B. Is JurisdictionalStatus "Generally Known"?
Since federal jurisdiction over the location of the crime involves
adjudicative facts, federal courts can only take judicial notice of such facts as
provided in Rule 201.6' As noted above, federal courts may only take judicial
notice of adjudicative facts that are "not subject to reasonable dispute in that
[they are] either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial

56. Even if the element of federal legislative jurisdiction is amixed question of law
and fact, Supreme Court precedent requires that the jury resolve this question. See
United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510-15 (1995) (holding that the materiality of a
false statement is a mixed question of law and fact that must be decided by the jury).
57. Treating federal jurisdiction as an immutable legislative fact may also be
incorrect as a factual matter. The federal government may cede jurisdiction at any time
by, e.g., transferring property located within a federal fort to a private party without
stating in the deed that it intends to retain exclusive or concurrent legislative jurisdiction.
See, e.g., United States v. Goings, 504 F.2d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that the

federal government divested itself of jurisdiction over the area of the fort where the
assault occurred when it transferred the property to a private corporation without
expressly retaining jurisdiction). Thus, if the government, before Defendant B's assault,
sold a parcel of the property where both assaults A and B in the example above occurred,
the location of the second offense may in fact no longer have been within the special
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
58. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
59. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
60. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 ("[T]he relevant inquiry is not of form, but of
effect-does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that
authorized by the jury's guilty verdict?").
61. FED. R. EvID. 201(a).
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court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 6 2 Several courts of appeals
have held that federal legislative jurisdiction over land is "generally known. 63
The argument is that everyone knows that Leavenworth Penitentiary, for
example, is a federal prison. Accordingly, judicial economy permits judicial
notice of that fact, thereby saving the government and the defendant from having
to litigate an issue about which there is no reasonable dispute.
This reasoning does not hold up upon examination. The jurisdictional
status of the location of the offense-not its use by the federal government or
denomination as a federal installation-is what is at issue in statutes requiring
proof of this element. Rule 201(b)(1)'s "generally known" prong is only
intended to encompass such facts as a reasonable layperson within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court would know through her unaided memory.64 While
the average reasonable person might know of the existence or nominally federal
character of a federal installation, it is highly unlikely that such a person has any
familiarity with that installatibn's jurisdictional status as defined by the
Constitution, relevant statutes, case law and the historical facts.65 Thus, judicial
notice of the federal government's jurisdiction over the location of the offense,
if it is to be taken at all, must rest on Rule 201(b)(2).
C. Can JurisdictionalStatus be Ascertained by Reference to Sources
of Reasonably UnquestionableAccuracy?
Because jurisdictional status is not something a reasonable person would
know from her unaided memory, judicial notice of federal jurisdiction can only
be taken under Rule 201 (b)(2). Whether the federal government ever actually

62. FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, No. 00-4150, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23827, at

*10 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000) ("Here, the indictment charged that the crime occurred at
Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Fort Belvoir's location was generally known in the Alexandria
Division of the Eastern District of Virginia.").
64. 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 5105, at 489 (1977) ("[I]f the fact is one that a reasonable person would
not know from memory, but would know where to find, it falls within subdivision (2),"
rather than (1).).

65. See United States v.Bello, 194 F.3d 18,23 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Although the label
'federal penitentiary' might suggest to the average person that MDC-Guaynabo is under
the jurisdiction of the United States, it is unlikely that the 'reasonable person' has any
familiarity with MDC-Guaynabo at all, let alone its jurisdictional status."). The Fourth
Circuit recently made this error in Lee, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23827, conflating whether
Fort Belvoir's existence and use by the federal government were "generally known" with
whether Fort Belvoir'sj urisdictional status and boundaries were "generally known." See
infra Part VI (discussing the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Lee).
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acquired exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction over the location in question can
be determined by reference to sources such as letters or legislation by the state
ceding jurisdiction,66 letters from the United States accepting jurisdiction,67 and
official, verified government maps delineating the areas of the property where
the federal government currently enjoys exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.6"
Federal prosecutors can obtain the evidence from the federal agencies within
their districts69 and introduce such evidence at a limited evidentiary hearing held
specifically to address jurisdictional issues.
Requiring judicial notice of the jurisdictional element of federal criminal
offenses to be taken under Rule 201(b)(2), rather than Rule 201(b)(1), is more
than merely a procedural hoop through which the government and the court
should be required to jump. Should the trial court decide to take judicial notice
under Rule 201(b)(2), it must do so based upon actual sources of reasonably
unquestionable accuracy, rather than upon conjecture about what a reasonable
person "knows" about a federal installation's jurisdictional status and
boundaries. A preliminary hearing wherein the prosecution is required to
produce such sources may reveal that there is a sufficient factual question
regarding the federal government's jurisdiction over the location of the offense
that the court cannot take judicial notice.70 If the prosecution does produce
materials of sufficient indisputability, the court may take judicial notice,
provided it instructs the jury that they are free to disregard the matter judicially
noticed and find the element not proven.
V. JUDICIAL NOTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES: FEDERAL RULE 201(G)
The defendant's right to jury trial requires that the jury have the ultimate say
on whether the jurisdictional element of the offense has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. In that sense, Rule 201(g) is unremarkable. After all, "proof
of [a jurisdictional element] is no different from proof of any other element of a
federal crime."7 Itmust be alleged in the indictment and proved beyond the

66. See, e.g., Bello, 194 F.3d at 23-24.
67. Id.

68. Id.; see also Gov't of Canal Zone v. Burjan, 596 F.2d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 1979).
69. See U.S. Attorneys' Manual, Criminal Resource Manual, No. 665 (Supp. 2000)
("Each United States Attorney would be well advised to request from each agency within

the district a report on the jurisdictional status claimed for each of its facilities and
assurance that documentation is available.").
70. See infra Part VI (discussing the Court of Military Appeals' opinion in
Williams II, which determined that 50,000 acres of Fort Hood were not within federal
legislative jurisdiction).
71. United States v. Prentiss, 206 F.3d 960, 969 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Hugi v.
United States, 164 F.3d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1999)).
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jury's reasonable doubt. Rule 201(g) represents Congress's attempt to balance
the interests of judicial efficiency with the jury trial rights of the accused.
The legislative history of Rule 201(g) demonstrates that Congress gave
substantial thought to how to reconcile the competing interests implicated by
judicial notice in criminal cases. The proposal for Rule 201(g) that emerged
from the Senate would have made judicial notice binding on the jury in both civil
and criminal cases.72 The House version, which was adopted in conference,
rejected making judicial notice binding in criminal cases. Congress reasoned
that while a "mandatory instruction to a jury in a criminal case to accept as
conclusive any fact judicially noticed is inappropriate because contrary to the
spirit of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial... a discretionary instruction
in criminal trials" would be constitutional." The congressional reasoning in
favor of the constitutionality of the Rule 201(g) procedure was that the jury
would retain the ultimate power to decide whether the element had been proven.
The Advisory Committee's Notes on the subsequently adopted draft also reflect
this view. The Committee noted that:
The considerations which underlie the general rule that a verdict
cannot be directed against the accused in a criminal case seem to
foreclose the judge's directing the jury on the basis of judicial notice
to accept as conclusive any adjudicative facts in the case. However,
this view presents no obstacle to the judge's advising the jury as to a
matter judicially noticed, if he instructs them that it need not be taken
as conclusive.74
Of course, Congress's view that Rule 201 (g) sufficiently protects the right
to jury trial is not conclusive. The reasoning in Apprendi and Ring,75 taken to its
logical conclusion, calls into question Rule 201(g)'s constitutionality, because
the Rule does not actually require the prosecution to submit evidence to the jury
proving the matter beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the Rule only requires
that the jury have the opportunity to reject the court's judicial notice. This
Article, however, makes a less sweeping proposition: a court violates the
defendant's right to jury trial by takingjudicial notice without instructing the jury

72. See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 6-7 (1973), reprintedin 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,
7079-80 (cited in Bello, 194 F.3d at 25).
73. Id. at 7. Congress was not operating in a jurisprudential vacuum when it
decided to makejudicial notice binding only in civil cases. Many state rules of evidence
make the court's judicial notice binding on the juryin both civil and criminal cases. See
Turner, supra note 28, at 199.
74. 1WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 201, at app. 0 1(3) (quoting FED. R.EVID.
201 advisory committee's note (March 1969 draft)) (cited in Bello, 194 F.3d at 25).
75. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466 (2000).
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that they must make the final determination. The few pre-Apprendi decisions
directly addressing the issue have held that a Rule 201 (g) instruction adequately
protects the right to jury trial.76 The fallout from Apprendi and Ring may well
result in the invalidation of Rule 201(g) and similar state procedures. In the
event that it does not, the framework suggested by this Article" is consistent
with existing Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
'VI. PERTINENT CASES IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS

Despite Rule 201(g)'s clear language, the courts of appeals are split on
whether the failure to give a Rule 201(g) instruction requires reversal. 8
Appellate opinions on the issue fall into four categories: (1) misunderstanding
or misapplication of Rule 201 in general or Rule 201 (g) specifically; (2) explicit
disregard of the mandatory nature of Rule 201 (g) because of disagreement with
the policy expressed in the Rule (e.g., a belief that Rule 201(g) is irrational or
inefficient); (3) recognition that the trial court's failure to give a Rule 201(g)
instruction may violate the defendant's right to jury trial, but affirming the
conviction nonetheless for other independently valid reasons; or (4) finding that
failure to give a Rule 201(g) instruction requires reversal. Most opinions
addressing Rule 201(g) fall within the first and third categories.
Examples abound of courts misunderstanding or misapplying the rules
governing judicial notice in criminal cases. Most recently, in United States v.
Lee,79 the Fourth Circuit rejected the appellant's challenge to his conviction
based in part on the trial court's failure to give a Rule 201 (g) instruction and the
government's failure to introduce at trial any evidence indicating that the place
of the assault was within federal jurisdiction.8" The Fourth Circuit held that it
76. See, e.g., Bello, 194 F.3d at 25 ("Of course, compliance with Rule 201 does not
establish that application of Rule 201 in this case was constitutional.... Nonetheless,
there is widespread agreement that Rule 201(g), which makes judicial notice nonconclusive in criminal cases, adequately safeguards the criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to a trial byjury.").
77. See infra Part VIII.

78. See supranotes 7-8.
79. No. 00-4150, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23827 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000).
80. The trial court in Lee instructed the jury as follows:

The Government has offered evidence that the assault or the aggravated
assault charged in the indictment occurred at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The

Court has taken judicial notice that Fort Belvoir, Virginia is within the
jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of this statute. If you find that
the offense occurred at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, then you may find that this

element has been proved. If you find that the offense did not occur at Fort
Belvoir, Virginia, then it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Lee v. United States, 230 F.3d 1355 (4th Cir. 2000)
(No. 00-1030).
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was proper for the trial court to remove this element of the offense from the
jury's consideration. The court reasoned as follows:
[T]he indictment charged that the crime occurred at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia. Fort Belvoir's location was generally known in the
Alexandria Division of the Eastern District of Virginia and verifiable
from "sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned."
Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's taking judicial
notice of this fact.8
The opinion in Lee illustrates many of the problems with judicial notice in
criminal cases. First, likely because of its unwillingness to confront the issue, the
Lee court did not even address defendant's argument that the trial court's failure
to give a Rule 201(g) instruction warranted reversal.8 2 Second, as a factual
matter, the correct question under a Rule 201(b)(1) analysis83 was not whether

This instruction left open the possibility that thejury could find that the assault did
not occur at Fort Belvoir. However, it effectively prevented the jury from finding that,
although the offense occurred at Fort Belvoir, Fort Belvoir itself (or the specific location
at Fort Belvoir where the assault occurred) was not within the federal government's
special territorial jurisdiction. The clear import of the instruction, despite the "may" in
the third sentence, was that the only question left for the jury to resolve on this element
was whether the offense occurred on the grounds of Fort Belvoir, not whether Fort
Belvoir was within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
81. Lee, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 23827, at *10. The Fourth Circuit in Lee relied,
inter alia, on its earlier and oft-cited decision in UnitedStates v. Lavender, 602 F.2d 639
(4th Cir. 1979). In Lavender, the defendants were convicted under the Assimilative
Crimes Act of burglary and larceny at a place within the special territorial jurisdiction of
the United States. Id. at 640, 641. The court rejected the defendants' argument that
proof that the offense occurred on a federal highway was insufficient to establish the
jurisdictional element of the offense. Id. at 641. Although no proof was submitted to
show that the highway was within federal jurisdiction, and the trial court in fact declined
to take judicial notice of this element, the Fourth Circuit held that it could take judicial
notice of federal jurisdiction in the first instance on appeal. Id. The Lavender court's
holding raises another issue: whether appellate courts maytakejudicial notice in the first
instance. See the discussion of Burjanand Williams II, infra Part VI, both of which held
that judicial notice in a criminal case in the first instance on appeal violates the right to
jury trial. An appellate court's taking judicial notice in the first instance in a criminal
case is effectively the same as the trial court's taking judicial notice but failing to give
a Rule 201(g) instruction. In either case, Rule 201(g) and the defendant's right to jury
trial are violated because the jury has had no opportunity to pass on the facts judicially
noticed.
82. See Brief for Appellant at 48, United States v. Lee, No. 00-4150, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23827 (4th Cir. Sept. 26, 2000); see also Lee, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
23827.
83. As already noted, Rule 201(b)(1) does not provide a proper basis for judicial
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Fort Belvoir's locationwas generally known, but whether itsjurisdictionalstatus

was generally known. 4 Third, if the Lee court intended to rely on Rule
201(b)(2), as well as Rule 201(b)(1), it failed to consider that the prosecution in
Lee had not presented-and the trial court therefore could not have
considered-any sources of reasonably unquestionable accuracy supporting
judicial notice of this element of the offense."5
6 also
The court's opinion in United States v. Hernandez-Fundora"
demonstrates a misunderstanding of the rules governingjudicial notice in federal
criminal cases. The defendant in that case was convicted of assaulting another
prisoner.8 7 He challenged the conviction on the ground that the court's judicial
notice that the prison was within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United
States was improper, since the court did not instruct the jury as required by Rule
201(g)."8 The Second Circuit rejected this challenge on two grounds. First, the
court held that the trial court properly left the "factual" element (whether the
assault occurred at the prison) to the jury, while merely removing the "legal"
question (whether the federal government had jurisdiction over the prison) from
the jury's consideration. Second, the court believed that the jurisdictional issue
only involved legislative facts, meaning that Rule 201(g) was inapplicable.8 9
The first rationale for the Hernandez-Fundoracourt's decision is incorrect
for the same reason as in Lee. The question was not only whether the offense
actually occurred at the federal prison, but also whether the prison was within the
special territorial jurisdiction of the United States, an element of the charged

notice of special territorial jurisdiction.
84. See supra Part IV.B.
85. See supra Part IV.C; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 82, at 47-48.
86. 58 F.3d 802 (2d Cir. 1995).
87. Id. at 804-05.
88. Id. at 809-10. The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
[T]he government must prove the alleged assault took place within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This simply means
that the alleged assault must have occurred in any lands reserved or acquired
for the use of the United States and under the exclusive or concurrent
jurisdiction thereof. I charge you now that [the prison] is a place that falls
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Therefore, if you find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the [act] alleged occurred at [the prison], the
sixth element of the offense has been met.
Id. at 809.
89. Id. at 811.
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offense.9" This question could only be resolved by answering subsidiary factual
determinations that fell within the jury's province."'
Burjan92 provides a good example of the third category of cases: those
recognizing the restrictions on judicial notice in criminal cases, but nevertheless
affirming the conviction for other independently valid reasons.93 The defendant
in Bur/an argued that the government failed to prove that the offenses occurred
within the Canal Zone (the jurisdictional element of the charged offenses). The
trial court did not take judicial notice of this element. The Fifth Circuit held that
it could, upon the introduction of proper evidence, take judicial notice in the first
instance on appeal.94 The court recognized that, in the usual case, Rule 201(g)
would be rendered a nullity if appellate courts could take judicial notice of an
element of the offense in the first instance on appeal, since the jury would be
bypassed contrary to Rule 20 1(g).95 This problem was not presented in Burjan,
however, which was a non-jury trial. Accordingly, where the defendant has
waived the right to jury trial, an appellate court's judicial notice of an element
of the offense is not inconsistent with Rule 201(g).
The Burjan court also, unlike Lee or Hernandez-Fundora,took judicial
notice under Rule 201(b)(2), based on actual evidence establishing the Canal
Zone's boundaries.96 Because there was record evidence proving the location of
the offense, the Burjan court held that its judicial notice of the Canal Zone's

90. The defendant in Hernandez-Fundorawas convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 113(c)
(1988), which provides:
Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United

States, is guilty of an assault shall be punished as follows:
(c) Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, and without
just cause or excuse, by fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more
than five years, or both.
91. See supra Part III. The second basis for the Hernandez-Fundoracourt's

holding-that thejurisdictional element involved legislative facts-fares no better upon
examination. See supra Part IV.A; cf Turner, supra note 28, at 191-92 (discussing
United States v. Bowers, 660 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1981), and characterizing treatment of
the jurisdictional element as "legislative" in that case as a misapplication of Rule 201).

92. Gov't of Canal Zone v. Burjan, 596 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1979).
93. Cases finding that the failure to give a Rule 201(g) instruction is error, but

harmless, could be included in this category, but are discussed separately in Part VII.B
infra, because the harmless error doctrine is not an "independently valid" reason for
affirming the conviction. The Supreme Court's harmless error cases make clear that
complete removal from the jury of any element of a criminal offense is such a
fundamental structural error in the trial process that automatic reversal is required.
94. Burjan, 596 F.2d at 693-94.
95. Id. at 694; cf United States v. Williams, 17 M.J. 207, 215 (C.M.A. 1984)
("Williams II") (discussed in more detail infra).

96. Burjan, 596 F.2d at 693-94.
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boundaries was sufficient to affirm the first count of the conviction.97 The
Burjan court, therefore, demonstrated sensitivity to the Sixth Amendment
concerns raised by judicial notice in criminal cases because it: (1) recognized
that removing this element of the offense from the jury, whether via judicial
notice in the first instance on appeal or the trial court's failure to give a Rule
201(g) instruction, would raise substantial Sixth Amendment issues;98 and (2)
based its judicial notice on actual evidence, rather than speculating that an
element of the offense had been fulfilled.
The "disregard" problem concerning Rule 201(g) is vividly illustrated by
the Tenth Circuit's opinion in UnitedStates v. Piggie.99 InPiggie,the defendant
challenged his conviction under the Assimilative Crimes Act for sodomy
committed at Leavenworth Penitentiary on the grounds that the government
failed to offer any proof that the prison was within the special territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. The defendant further argued that the trial
court's error in taking judicial notice without such proof was compounded by its
failure to give a Rule 201(g) instruction, thereby depriving him of his right to
jury trial.'0 0 While the court believed there was sufficient evidence establishing
federal jurisdiction,'0 ' and also rested its holding on the plain error and harmless
error doctrines,'0 2 the clear motivation for the court's decision was its
disagreement with the policy choice embodied in Rule 201 (g). Recognizing the
mandatory nature of Rule 201(g), the court nonetheless forthrightly stated that

97. The court refused, however, to takejudicial notice as to the second count of the
offense because the evidence of the location of that offense was insufficiently precise.
Id. at 695.
98. The Burjan court did not explicitly so hold; rather, it held that the Sixth

Amendment was not implicated because the defendant had waived his right to jury trial.
Id. at 694. Nonetheless, the Burjan court at least recognized the Sixth Amendment
concerns raised by bypassing the jury on any element of the offense. Id.
99. 622 F.2d 486 (10th Cir. 1980).
100. Id. at 487-88.

101. Id. at 488-89. The only actual evidence the court pointed to as sufficient to
establish the jurisdictional element did not actually bear on the issue. The court cited
witnesses' testimony that they were employees or inmates of Leavenworth. Id. at 489.
This, of course, was not probative of whether the federal government had exclusive or

concurrent jurisdiction over their place of employment or detention. At most, it told the
court that those witnesses believed they worked or were imprisoned in a nominally
federal facility. The court also cited various jury instructions given by the trial court,
which were not "evidence" that could properly be considered in a sufficiency of the
evidence challenge to a sentence or conviction. Id.
102. Id. at 488, 489 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) (plain error); Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless error)). See the harmless error discussion in
Part VII infra.
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"we cannot bring ourselves to
give effect to [Rule 201(g)]. To do so would be
0 3
an exercise in the absurd."'1
Rule 201 (g) provoked the following statement by the Piggie court: "With
deference, [Rule 201(g)] is irrational. Actual application of the [Rule] makes
fools of the judge, the law and the jury.... Under the Congressional rule, in the
morning when the judge tries a civil case the world is round. That afternoon
when he tries a criminal case the world is flat."' 4 Indeed, the Piggie court went
so far as to state that applying Rule 201(g) would be "unjust and illogical" and
05
that courts were therefore "loath to meet this provision head on."'

103. Piggie, 622 F.2d at 488. Indeed, the Piggie court felt so strongly about the
irrationality of Rule 201 (g) that it included a separate appendix criticizing the Rule. Id.
at 488-90.
104. Id. at 489-90 (quoting 10 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE § 201.70).

105. Id. at 490. In fairness, the Piggie decision is not the. only place such strong
criticism is found. See generally Turner, supra note 28. See also Proposed Revisions
to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 330 (June 1997). Both Professor Turner's
article and the recommendations of the Proposed Revision suggest, inter alia, making
judicial notice binding in both civil and criminal cases, but explicitly providing for an
opportunity for the defendant to submit evidence rebutting the court's judicial notice.
While these proposals are arguably better than the predominant current practice of courts
applying Rule 201(g) (which is simply to ignore the Rule, wrongly classify the fact
judicially noticed as legislative, or hold that the failure to give a Rule 201(g) instruction
was harmless error), they share a common flaw. Namely, these proposals suggest that the
defendant's right to jury trial is adequately protected by allowing the defendant to submit
evidence rebutting the court's judicial notice. This clearly flips the ordinary process of
a criminal trial on its head. It is not the defendant's burden to disprove elements of the
offense. Rather, it is the prosecution's duty to affirmatively prove them beyond thejury's
reasonable doubt. Moreover, these proposals do not adequately address circumstances
where the prosecution fails to submit any evidence at all on the judicially noticed
element. Further, both proposals still recognize that eliminating Rule 201 (g)'s permissive
instruction in criminal cases raises concerns of fairness and accuracy. The commentary
to the Proposed Revision recognizes that, even under its proposal,
[i]t may be necessary for the appellate court to remand the case for further
evidence on the issue if it is unclear whether a fact is beyond reasonable
dispute within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. Courts are warned
that "[o]n any issue about which there is a hint of [reasonable] dispute, the
prosecution must submit proof, the defense may submit rebuttal evidence, and
the jury must consider [the issue]."
Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 171 F.R.D. 330, 399 (June 1997)
(quoting Turner, supra note 28, at 205). Under Professor Turner's proposal, the
defendant would be entitled to submit evidence challenging the judicial notice and
"should the court determine that the submitted evidence raises any doubt as to the
accuracy of the fact in question, judicial notice of said fact shall not be taken." Turner,
supra note 28, at 204.
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Piggieis notable for the court's candor. Although the court acknowledged
that Rule 201(g) is mandatory, it nevertheless refused to enforce the Rule
because it believed the Rule was "irrational." While this candor is perhaps
refreshing, and certainly more intellectually honest than cases grasping for a way
to find Rule 201(g) inapplicable, policy disagreement or concerns about
efficiency are not a sufficient basis for a federal court to ignore a
congressionally-mandated rule of evidence. 6 The hearsay rules are perhaps the
most glaring example of evidentiary restrictions that require a court to ignore
probative evidence. Yet the rules of hearsay (with all their exceptions, of course)
are routinely enforced by federal courts. The same holds true for the
exclusionary rule and a variety of other doctrines and rules that are thought to
outweigh simple efficiency.
A few courts have found that judicial notice of federal legislative
jurisdiction violates the right to jury trial where the trial court fails to give a Rule
201(g) instruction. In United States v. Williams, 7 the prosecution charged the
defendant with a kidnapping at Fort Hood. On appeal, the Court of Military
Appeals found that there was insufficient evidence supporting the jurisdictional
element of the offense and ordered the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether the specific location of the alleged kidnapping was under
federal jurisdiction.0 " Specifically, the court ordered the trial judge to hold a
hearing limited to determining the following: (1) the boundaries of Fort Hood;
(2) the types of federal jurisdiction over the entirety of Fort Hood; (3) the history
of and documents relating to the federal government's acquisition ofjurisdiction
over Fort Hood, including (a) Texas's cession of jurisdiction over the land
comprising Fort Hood and (b) the acceptance ofjurisdiction by the United States;
and (4) the location of places described in the indictment as pertaining to the
events of the offense.'0 9
As a result of the evidence presented at the hearing, it became apparent that
the federal government never acquired jurisdiction over almost 50,000 acres of

106. Or, for that matter, to construe the right to jury trial to apply only to those
elements of the offense a particular court believes it is "rational" for the jury to decide.
107. 14 M.J. 428, 429 (C.M.A. 1983) ("Williams I").
108. Id. at 429.
109. Id. The court referred to this truncated evidentiary proceeding as a "DuBay
hearing," referring to its earlier decision in United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411
(C.M.A. 1967). The Williams I court concluded that a DuBay hearing was triggered by
the military procedure rule requiring the prosecution in non-capital offenses to establish
the geographical boundaries of the areas in which the statute applies. Williams I, 14 M.J.
at 429 (citing MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL

213(e)(2) (Rev. ed. 1969)). It is not

suggested that this provision directly applies to non-military federal prosecutions.
Nonetheless, Williams I provides a useful framework for assessing the constitutional,
statutory and evidentiary requirements for federal jurisdiction as an element of the
offense in ordinary federal criminal prosecutions.
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the fort because it did not follow the required constitutional and statutory
procedures."' Subsequent to this evidentiary hearing, the matter was again
appealed. On appeal, the Williams II court refused to take judicial notice of the
jurisdictional status of the location of the alleged kidnapping.
The Williams II court's reasoning is instructive. First, it held that judicial
notice under Rule 201(b)(1)... was not appropriate because the government had
submitted no evidence showing that Fort Hood's jurisdictional status and
boundaries were "generally known.""' 2 The court noted that "[a]lthough some
may assume that a military installation automatically comes within Federal
jurisdiction, that assumption is incorrect." ' 3 The court also held that, given the
complexities of determining those jurisdictional boundaries, it could not take
judicial notice under Rule 201(b)(2) because the jurisdictional issue was not
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources of reasonably
unquestionable accuracy."4 Finally, even assuming the evidence would have
permitted the trial court to takejudicial notice of the jurisdictional element of the
offense, the Williams II court refused to take judicial notice on appeal, because
doing so would infringe the defendant's right to jury trial: "[A]ll factual issues
concerning guilt or innocence-including any issue of territorial
jurisdiction-must be submitted to the [jury] for determination. Even as to
adjudicative facts which the judge judicially notices, the court-martial members
have the final word, as they must be instructed under [Rule] 201(g).", '5
Williams II is important for several reasons. The Williams II court, unlike
most courts to address the issue, recognized that the assumption that a federal

110. United States v. Williams, 17 M.J. 207, 212 (C.M.A. 1984) ("Williams II").
See supra Part III for a description of these procedures.
111. Although the court was applying the Military Rules of Evidence rather than
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 201 is substantially the same in both sets of rules.
Military Rule of Evidence 201 (b)(1) requires that a judicially noticed fact be one that is
"generally known universally, locally, or in the area pertinent to the event"; Military Rule
of Evidence 201 (b)(2) is the same as Federal Rule of Evidence 201 (b)(2); and Military
Rule of Evidence 201(g) provides that "[tihe military judge shall instruct the members
[of the court-martial] that they may, but are not required to, accept as conclusive any
matter judicially noticed."
112. Williams 11, 17 M.J. at 214.
113. Id. at 211.
114. Id. at 214-15.
115. Id. at 215. The Court of Military Appeals, which is well-versed in these
matters, has adhered to Williams II in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., United States v.

Irvin, 21 M.J. 184, 186-89 (C.M.A. 1986) (following Williams II and noting that the
DuBay hearing ordered in Williams I "alert[ed] [the court] to the problems latent in
determining the extent of Federal jurisdiction over military installations"). Significantly,
the Irvin court held, unlike Williams II, that it would not allow the prosecution to remedy

its failure of proof on the jurisdictional element by conducting a DuBay hearing. Id. at
187.
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installation automatically falls within the special territorial jurisdiction of the
United States as defined in 18 U.S.C. Section 7(3) and the Constitution is
incorrect." 6 Williams I/demonstrates that a factual inquiry is necessary to make
this determination. Moreover, the Williams II court recognized that, even when
the trial court can properly take judicial notice of federal jurisdiction, Rule
201(g) and the Sixth Amendment require that the jury have the last word on
the issue.
Even though it set the bar higher than most courts by requiring an
evidentiary hearing on the jurisdictional issue, the Williams II court held that
such an evidentiary hearing alone was insufficient to protect the defendant's
right to jury trial. The court held that "[o]bviously, the DuBay hearing which we
ordered did not provide the [jury] an opportunity to participate in determining if
appellant's offense was committed within 'the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States."' 7 Thus, a DuBay hearing (and the limited
evidentiary hearing proposed by this Article) cannot be seen as a substitute for
a jury determination of all elements of the offense. Rather, such an evidentiary
hearing serves a screening function. The court cannot take judicial notice unless
sources of reasonably unquestionable accuracy upon evaluation demonstrate
beyond dispute that the jurisdictional element exists. Where this is the case, the
court may take judicial notice, but still must instruct the jury pursuant to Rule
201(g). If there is any reasonable dispute, the court cannot take judicial notice
8
at all; rather, the government must produce admissible" evidence sufficient to
prove the matter beyond the jury's reasonable doubt.
The Williams II procedure raises the question of why there is a judicial
notice mechanism in criminal cases, if the matter must still be submitted to the
jury. The sounder practice in a constitutional sense would indeed be to deal with
the jurisdictional matter the same as all other elements of the offense-i.e., to
submit proof of it to the jury. Yet the Williams II procedure does serve several
important functions if courts continue to take judicial notice of elements of
criminal offenses. The initial evidentiary hearing allows the court to screen out
those cases where there is any dispute as to the existence of the jurisdictional
element, either because the government fails to present sources satisfying Rule

116. See supra Part III.B.
117. United States v. Williams, 17 M.J. 207, 215 (C.M.A. 1984) ("Williams 1I").
118. A limited evidentiary hearing under Rule 201(b)(2) would not require the
sources supporting judicial notice to be admissible in evidence. See United States v.
Bello, 194 F.3d 18,24 n.8 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[A] judge can consult materials not otherwise
admissible in order to take judicial notice.") (quoting 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, JR., supra
note 64, § 5102, at 465). Thus, in a DuBay Rule 201 (b)(2) hearing, the court would be
allowed to consider, for example, a military official's testimony that he had seen the letter
from the federal government formally accepting the state's cession of jurisdiction, even
though this testimony might not be admissible at trial under the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
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201 (b)(2) or because the defendant offers rebuttal evidence tending to show that
the jurisdictional element does not exist. In other words, it sensitizes courts to
the need to conduct an actual examination of the facts before taking judicial
notice, rather than assuming that the federal government enjoys jurisdiction over
the location of the offense.
Moreover, the pertinent evidence need not be introduced at trial when the
court is properly satisfied that it can take judicial notice after holding the
evidentiary hearing, thereby saving time in most cases." 9 In a DuBay Rule
201 (b)(2) hearing, the court may consider evidence that would not be admissible
at trial, which also streamlines the determination. 2 ' In any event, if the
prosecution sees it as unnecessarily duplicative to have an initial evidentiary
hearing on the jurisdictional issue, it can simply not request that the court take
judicial notice and submit the evidence directly to the jury.
United States v. Mentz, 2' like Williams II, held that removal of the
jurisdictional element of a federal criminal offense from the jury's consideration
violated the defendant's right to jury trial. Mentz involved the trial court's
judicial notice of the FDIC-insured status'22 of two banks, an element of the
federal offense of bank robbery.' 23 Unlike the cases discussed above, the
prosecution in Mentz actually submitted evidence to the juryproving this element
of the offense. 24 On appeal, defendant argued that the court's jury instruction
removed the jurisdictional element from the jury's consideration in violation of

119. "'In a criminal case, Rule 201(g) treats judicial notice like a presumption; it
relieves one party of the need to produce evidence but does not prevent the other party
from contesting' the noticed fact with evidence and argument to the jury." Bello, 194
F.3d at 24 (quoting 21 WRIGHT &GRAHAM, JR., supra note 64, § 5111, at 534). In other
words, the difference is between submitting the matter to the jury (as the Sixth
Amendment and Rule 201 (g) require) and submitting evidence of the matter to the jury
(which is not necessary when the court properly takes judicial notice). Once the court
takes judicial notice, the jury generally will not receive evidence on the issue unless the
defendant submits evidence rebutting the existence of the jurisdictional element.
120. See supra note 119.
121. 840 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1988).
122. Id. at 319. Although Mentz dealt with FDIC-insured status rather than special
territorial jurisdiction, there is nothing in the Sixth Circuit's opinion that limits its
holding to this particular jurisdictional element. Indeed, FDIC-insured status is subject
to an even more "accurate and ready determination" via judicial notice than special
territorial jurisdiction, given the complexity of determining when federal legislative
jurisdiction exists under 18 U.S.C. § 7(3).
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2000). The offense in Mentz, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a),
requires the government to prove that the deposits of the institution robbed were FDICinsured at the time of the robbery. See id. § 2113(0.
124. Two witnesses testified that the banks were FDIC-insured at the time of the
robberies. Mentz, 840 F.2d at 318.
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the Sixth Amendment.125 The Sixth Circuit agreed, not on the ground that the
evidence was insufficient, 26 but rather on the basis that the trial court had
unconstitutionally arrogated to itself the jury's role. Thus, Mentz squarely
addressed the question of whether it is reversible error 127 for a court to remove
the jurisdictional element of the offense from the jury's actual consideration,
even where the record evidence
would be sufficient for the jury to find that the
1 28
elements had been proven.
The Mentz court began with the proposition that the Sixth Amendment and
the Due Process Clause prohibit the trial judge from directing the jury to come
forward with a finding that an element of the offense has been proven. 29 The
court went on to hold that the trial judge's conclusive statement that the banks
were FDIC-insured at the time of the robbery amounted to an unconstitutional
directed verdict in favor of the prosecution, because the instruction "had the
effect of relieving the government of its burden of proving, beyond the jury's
reasonable doubt, that the accused committed the crimes charged."' 30
Importantly, the Mentz court also held that the jury instruction could not be
rehabilitated via principles ofjudicial notice,' since the trial court failed to give
a Rule 201(g) instruction. Noting that Rule 201(g) preserves the jury's
traditional prerogative in a criminal case to ignore even uncontroverted facts in
reaching a verdict, the court held:
A trial court commits constitutional error when it takes judicial notice
of facts constituting an essential element of the crime charged, but fails

125. The trial court instructed the jury that each bank's deposits "were insured by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation at the time of the offenses alleged in the
indictment." Id. at 318-19. The trial court did not instruct the jury pursuant to Rule
201(g) that they were not required to accept this instruction as binding. Id. at 322.
126. Id. at 320 ("It is not important that the jury might have reached a similar
conclusion had it been given an opportunity to decide the issue under a correct
instruction.").
127. The court, as discussed in more detail infra, also rejected the government's
argument that the constitutional error was harmless.
128. Mentz also implicitly rejects the argument (discussed in note 34, supra) that
a general prefatory "reasonable doubt" instruction cures the jury's later impression that
an element has been completely removed from its consideration. The trial court in Mentz
preliminarily instructed thejury that the government was required to prove the elements
of the offense "beyond a reasonable doubt to warrant your finding of guilty in this case."
Mentz, 840 F.2d at 318.
129. Id. at 320.
130. Id. (emphasis in original).
131. The Mentz court correctly noted that even if the trial court had taken judicial
notice, such judicial notice would have been subject to Rule 201 since the jurisdictional
element involved adjudicative facts. Id. at 322 n. 13; see also supra Part IV.A (explaining
why the element of special territorial jurisdiction is an adjudicative fact).
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to instruct the jury according to Rule 201(g). The court's decision to
accept the element as established conflicts with the bedrock principle
thejury's reasonable doubt,
that the government must prove, beyond
32
every essential element of the crime.
Taken together, Williams II and Mentz therefore stand for the following six key
principles:
(1) The jurisdictional element of a federal criminal offense is an
adjudicative fact, of which the trial court can only take judicial notice
subject to the requirements of Rule 201;'
(2) The trial court may not render even a partial directed verdict in
favor of the prosecution;' 34
(3) Removing the jurisdictional element of a criminal offense from the
jury, by judicial notice or otherwise, amounts to a partial directed
verdict in violation of the defendant's right to jury trial;'35
(4) The court can only take judicial notice of the jurisdictional element
based upon actual sources of reasonably unquestionable accuracy; 36
(5) When taking judicial notice, the court must separately 37 instruct
the jury under Rule 201(g) that it retains its traditional prerogative to
disregard the court's judicial notice and;

132. Mentz, 840 F.2d at 322 (emphasis in original). The court's Rule 201
discussion can perhaps be characterized as dicta since it appears that the district court did
not actually take judicial notice of the jurisdictional element. Id.
133. Mentz, 840 F.2d at 322; United States v. Williams, 17 M.J. 207, 215 (C.M.A.
1984) ("Williams II").
134. Mentz, 840 F.2d at 320.
135. See Mentz, 840 F.2d 315 (where the trial court did not actually take judicial
notice, but its instruction removed thejurisdictional issue from thejury's consideration);
Williams II, 17 M.J. at 214-15 (refusing to take judicial notice in the first instance on
appeal, since doing so would bypass the jury).
136. Mentz, 840 F.2d at 322 ("Care should be taken by the court to identify the fact
it is noticing, and its justification for doing so.") (quoting Colonial Leasing Co. of New
England, Inc. v. Logistics Control Group Int'l, 762 F.2d 454, 459 (5th Cir. 1985));
Williams II, 17 M.J. at 214 (ordering aDuBay hearing in order to evaluate such sources).
137. Mentz, 840 F.2d at 321, 321 n.10 (reversing the conviction, despite the trial
court's general prefatory reasonable doubt jury instruction).
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(6) As discussed in detail infra, the trial court's failure to give a Rule
201(g) instruction is not subject to harmless error analysis, but rather
requires reversal.138

VII. ROSE-COLORED GLASSES? CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITIONS ON
DIRECTED VERDICTS IN FAVOR OF THE PROSECUTION
A. The Right to a Jury DeterminationofAll Elements of the Offense

Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The Due Process Clause requires that the government prove every element
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Sixth Amendment requires that
the jury make the determination of whether the government has met its burden.' 39
These principles are the bedrock of the criminal justice system in the United
States. 4" The Supreme Court recently reiterated the historical purpose of the
right to jury trial:

138. The Bello court, although affirming the appellant's conviction, also
recognized that failure to give a Rule 201(g) instruction unconstitutionally deprives the
defendant of his right to jury trial. See United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18, 25 (1 st Cir.
1999) (holding that the trial court'sjudicial notice of special territorial jurisdiction in that
case was permissible only because it gave a Rule 201 (g) instruction, which "adequately
safeguard[ed] the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury"); see
also United States v. Prentiss, 206 F.3d 960 (10th Cir. 2000). Although Prentissdid not
involve judicial notice, the court's reasoning is important because it conducted an
exhaustive inquiry into the nature of determining whether the jurisdictional element of
a federal crime has been proven. In Prentiss,the defendant was convicted of arson under
18 U.S.C. § 1152, which requires proof both that the offense occurred in "Indian
country" and that the crime occurred between an Indian and a non-Indian. Id. at 966.
The court vacated the conviction because the indictment failed to allege (and the
government introduced no proof of) the non-Indian status of the victim. Id. at 977. The
Prentisscourt held that this fundamental jurisdictional defect, in violation of defendant's
Fifth Amendment grandjury indictment right, was not subject to harmless error analysis.
Id.
139. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510-15 (1995); Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
140. Justice Scalia, reviewing the historical evidence, has gone as far as to call the
jury trial guarantee-the only one that appears both in the body of the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights-the "spinal column of American democracy." Neder v. United States,
527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Professor Akhil Reed Amar has also
persuasively demonstrated the centrality of the right to jury trial in our constitutional
system. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms,
28 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 1169, 1169-72 (1995).
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[T]o guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of
• ..rulers," and "as the great bulwark of [our] civil and political
liberties," trial by jury has been understood to require that "the truth
of every accusation . ..should afterwards be confirmed by the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of [the defendant's] equals and
neighbours.' 4 '
The Court has also directly addressed the trial court's role in evidentiary matters
in criminal cases:
[A] trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or
directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict. .. regardless
of how overwhelming the evidence may point in that direction. The
trial judge is thereby barred from attempting to override or interfere
with the jurors' independent judgment in a manner contrary to the
interests of the accused." 2
Nonetheless, when it comes to jurisdictional elements of federal crimes,
federal courts have regularly undermined these constitutional principles. It is
clear, however, that at least as to elements that are clearly part of the statutory
definition of the offense' 43 (such as whether the offense occurred within "federal

141. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,477 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
142. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977)
(internal citations omitted).
143. The continuing debates regarding what is properly considered an element of
the offense and when sentencing factors must be found by thej ury are largely beyond the
scope of this Article. It need only be noted here that the Supreme Court has made clear
that it intends lower courts to take the role of the jury seriously in all contexts:
We do not suggest that trial practices cannot change in the course of centuries
and still remain true to the principles that emerged from the Framers' fears
"that the jury right could be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion."
But practice must at least adhere to the basic principles, undergirding the
requirements of trying to a jury all facts necessary to constitute a statutory
offense, and proving those facts beyond reasonable doubt.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483-84 (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 500 (Thomas,
J., concurring) (discussing the Court's jurisprudence on what constitutes an element of
the offense). In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Court applied Apprendi in
invalidating Arizona's capital punishment scheme, under which ajudge rather than the
jury finds the facts justifying a death sentence. As previously noted, Apprendi and Ring
in fact provide a substantial basis for arguing that Rule 201(g) itself is unconstitutional
because, even under the procedure outlined in this Article, the government need not
actually submit proof of the jurisdictional element to the jury for determination beyond
a reasonable doubt. While Apprendi and Ring are sentencing decisions, they may well
be on a collision course with judicial notice of elements of criminal offenses in any
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jurisdiction"), Supreme Court precedent requires that the jury determine whether
the elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The predominant
practice of today's federal courts of completely removing the jurisdictional
element from the jury's consideration cannot be squared with these precedents.
Convictions under these circumstances could nonetheless be affirmed on appeal,
despite the constitutional error, under the harmless error doctrine. A proper
understanding of the Supreme Court's harmless error cases, however, indicates
that the harmless error doctrine should not apply when the trial court has
removed an element of the offense from the jury.

B. Is Failureto Instruct the Jury that It Is Not Bound by the Court's
JudicialNotice Harmless Error?
Courts looking for a reason to affirm a conviction despite fundamental
constitutional error can find easy comfort in the harmless error doctrine.'" Even
where a court holds that the failure to give a Rule 201(g) instruction violates the
right to jury trial, it may conclude that the error was harmless and that the
conviction must therefore be affirmed. Harmless error review applies where the
defendant has made an objection to the issue at trial and the error is one which
is not so "fundamental" that it renders the verdict constitutionally unfair. If the
error falls within the category of errors to which harmless error review applies,
the reviewing court must then reverse unless the prosecution demonstrates that
the error was actually harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 45 A proper

circumstance.
144. Actually, both the doctrines of plain error and harmless error are relevant to
the issues raised by binding judicial notice in criminal cases. The plain error doctrine,
incorporated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), provides that an error not
objected to at trial will only be grounds for reversal where: (1) there was an error; (2)
that was clear or obvious under current law; (3) that affected defendant's substantial
rights; and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation ofjudicial
proceedings. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-36 (1993). Whether the
appellate court is reviewing the error under the plain error or harmless error doctrine can
make a difference. See, e.g., United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 942 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the element of guilty
knowledge was not plain error, but reversing nonetheless because the government failed
to argue it was harmless). The discussion here, as a shorthand, refers only to the harmless
error doctrine. Complete removal of the jurisdictional element from thejury would also
be plain error because: (1)the Court's Sixth Amendment cases clearly prohibit directed
verdicts in favor of the prosecution; (2) the defendant enjoys a substantial right to an
actual jury determination of all elements of the offense; and (3) given the fundamental
nature ofthejurytrial guarantee, the fairness and integrity of criminal prosecutions suffer
where the court substitutes its own judgment for the jury's.
145. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 2.
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understanding of the effect of the trial court's binding judicial notice in a
criminal case indicates that harmless error review should not apply in
46
such cases.
There is a substantial body of Supreme Court and lower court precedent
indicating that the complete removal of any element of a criminal offense from
the jury is not subject to the harmless error rule.'47 In Rose v. Clark, 48 the
defendant challenged ajury instruction stating that all homicides were presumed
to be malicious, thus excusing the prosecution from proving this element of the
offense. 49 The Court held that harmless error review applied to this
constitutionally defective jury instruction. 5 ' The Court distinguished the
instruction in Rose from those errors that render the verdict fundamentally unfair
and therefore "require reversal without regard to the evidence in the particular

146. Application of the harmless error rule to constitutional errors first took root
in Chapman v. California,386 U.S. 18 (1967). The Chapman Court rejected the view
that harmless error review could never apply to constitutional errors. Rather, the Court
held, certain constitutional errors may "in the setting of a particular case [be] so
unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be
deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." Id. at 22. The
Chapman rule (that a limited class of constitutional errors may be subject to harmless
error analysis) has been upended by more recent Supreme Court cases, which have made
application of harmless error review to constitutional error the rule rather than the
exception. See the discussion of Neder, 527 U.S. l, and Arizona v. Fulminante,499 U.S.
279 (1991), infra.
147. The Supreme Court has not yet squarely addressed the split in the circuits over
whether completely removing an element of the offense from thej ury's consideration can
ever be harmless error. See Teel v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1007, 1008 (1990) (White, J.,
dissenting). The Court may soon be forced to confront the issue. The Ring Court
remanded the case to the Arizona courts, noting that the determination of whether the
error in that case (the judge, rather than the jury, finding the facts supporting the
"pecuniary gain" aggravating factor triggering the death penalty) was harmless should be
made by lower courts in the first instance. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 n.7 (citing Neder, 527
U.S. at 25). In Summerlin v. Stewart, No. 98-99002, 2003 WL 22038399 (9th Cir. Sept.
2, 2003), the Ninth Circuit, in deciding to apply Ring retroactively, held that harmless
error analysis did not apply to those pre-Ring cases where the judge, rather than the jury,
found the aggravating factors triggering the death penalty. Id. at **25-35. This case, also
arising from Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, is likely to prompt Supreme Court
review because of the importance of the decision and the now clear circuit split on
whether Ring error is subject to harmless error review.
148. 478 U.S. 570 (1986).
149. Id. at 574-75 (citing Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523-24 (1979));
see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
150. Rose, 478 U.S. at 582. The Court remanded the case to the court of appeals
to determine whether the error was in fact harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
584.
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case.""' The Court included in that category those cases where a court directs
a verdict for the prosecution, because in such cases "the [s]tate cannot contend
that the deprivation was harmless because the evidence established the
defendant's guilt; the error in such a case is that the wrong entity judged the
defendant guilty."' 52 Thus, the Rose Court reasoned that a finding of guilt by the
wrong factfinder inherently renders the verdict fundamentally unfair. The Court
distinguished the instruction in Rose from a directed verdict for the prosecution
on the issue, because the instruction only created a presumption of malice; the
jury still had to find the existence of the facts supporting malice beyond a
reasonable doubt, and was free to reject the presumption." 3 Had the instruction
in Rose stated that the judge found that malice existed, the Court's opinion
makes clear that harmless error review would not have applied and automatic
reversal would have been required. This is the same framework required by Rule
201(g) since judicial notice, when taken subject to Rule 201(g), operates as a
presumption that the jury may accept or reject.' 54 When the court transforms this
presumption into a partial directed verdict by failing to issue a Rule 201(g)
instruction, Rose indicates that harmless error review should not apply.
Moreover, as the Seventh Circuit has cogently explained, the fact that the
directed verdict in such a case is partial rather than whole is a distinction without
a constitutional difference. Harmless error review "also does not apply when the
judge directs a partial verdict against the defendant by telling the jury that one
element of the crime ... has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, so that jury
needn't worry its collective head over that one."'
Certain lower courts have followed Rose's reasoning and held that the
complete removal of an element of the offense from the jury's consideration can
never be considered harmless error. In Mentz, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
151. Id. at 577 (citing examples of errors never subject to harmless error analysis).
152. Id. at 578.

153. Rose, 478 U.S. at 580-81 n.8 ("Because a presumption does not remove the
issue of intent from thejury's consideration, it is distinguishable from other instructional
errors that prevent a jury from considering an issue.").
154. See supra note 119.
155. United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 1988). The defendant in
Kerley challenged his conviction on the ground that, inter alia, the trial court's
instructions effectively removed from the jury the element of knowledge of the duty to
register under the Selective Service Act. Id. at 935. After examining the theoretical basis
for the harmless error doctrine, the court stated that "it is enough to note that among the
errors to which the harmless-error rule does not apply is an error that has the practical
effect of withdrawing the issue of guilt from the jury." Id. at 938 (emphasis added); cf
United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936,946-48 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the alleged
partial directed verdict in that case was not "structural error" requiring reversal without
regard to the plain or harmless error doctrines because it was not a case where "thejudge
determines that the government's evidence alone proves the element and thus takes it
from the jury") (citing United States v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1988)).
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the trial court's taking judicial notice of the FDIC-insured status of the banks that
were robbed, while failing to give a Rule 201(g) instruction, was not subject to
harmless error review.' 56 The court reasoned that "[b]y placing a judicial
imprimatur on the government's proof with respect to an element of the offense,
the faulty instruction directed a partial verdict for the prosecution, ensuring that
the jury would not find all elements beyond a reasonable doubt ...

thereby

rendering the trial fundamentally unfair."' 7 Because the error was one that
transcended the trial process, as opposed to an error in how the trial proceeded,
the court held that removal of this element from the jury was not subject to
harmless error review.
More recently, in Summerlin v. Stewart,'58 the Ninth Circuit, relying on
Sullivan,'" Rose, 60 and Fulminante,6 ' held that Ring 62 error-a judge, rather
than a jury, deciding the facts that lead to the death penalty-is not subject to
harmless error review. The court reasoned that such an error is so fundamental
that harmless error review does not apply. 63 The court held that the effect of the
error in allowing ajudge to find the facts triggering a death sentence meant that:
[T]he wrong entity found [the defendant] to be guilty of a capital
crime.... A complete deprivation of the right to ajury is an error that
does not arise during a presentation to a jury.... This type of error

156. Mentz, 840 F.2d at 324.
157. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted); see also United States
v. Prentiss, 206 F.2d 960, 975 (10th Cir. 2000) (rejecting harmless error analysis in that
case because "the [indictment's] complete omission of an essential element of the crime
...
is a fundamental jurisdictional defect that is not subject to harmless error analysis,"
despite the absence of prejudice to the defendant).
158. No. 98-99002, 2003 WL 22038399 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2003).
159. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
160. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570 (1986).

161. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
162. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
163. The court's harmless error discussion was relevant to its determination under
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), that Ring applies retroactively to persons who had
exhausted their direct appeals prior to Ring. The second element of the Teague analysis
requires the court to determine whether the new procedural rule for which retroactive
application is sought is a "'watershed rule of criminal procedure' that ... alters our
understanding of bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a particular
conviction." Summerlin, 2003 WL 22038399, at * 15 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311).
The court reasoned that constitutional errors that are not subject to harmless error review
are by definition "structural" or "fundamental" and that such fundamental errors satisfy
the second Teague requirement because the newly announced rule repudiating the error
changes the understanding of essential procedural elements of the law. Id. at **25-35.
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cannot be cured, or determined harmless, by examining other
[evidence] that may have been presented at trial.' 64

It must be recognized that recent Supreme Court cases 6 ' have struck a
serious, but not fatal, blow to the reasoning of Rose and Martin Linen. In a
sharply divided opinion, the Court in Neder v. United States' held that a jury
instruction completely omitting an element of the offerse (materiality of false
statements in that case) was subject to harmless error review.' 67 The Neder
Court reasoned that all constitutional errors, aside from a limited class of cases,
are subject to harmless error review.'68 Specifically, the Court held that there is
only a very limited class of errors that are so "structural" that they transcend the
trial process and require automatic reversal. 69 A jury instruction omitting an
element of the offense, in the Neder Court's view, is a "trial error" that does not
necessarily render the verdict fundamentally unfair. 7 Moreover, the Neder
Court held that the omission of an element of the offense from the jury
instructions was in fact harmless in that case because evidence in the record
incontrovertibly established materiality. 7 '
At first blush, Neder appears to be the death-knell for cases such as Rose
and Martin Linen. The Neder Court held that harmless error review applies
where the trial court effectively prevents the jury from considering an element
of the offense and decides the issue itself. But Neder did not purport to abrogate
Rose.'72 The Neder Court, in fact, explicitly reaffirmed the validity of Rose's

164. Summerlin, 2003 WL 22038399, at *31.

165. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.
275 (1993); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
166. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).

167. Id. at 7-8. The effect of the erroneous instruction in Neder was, at least on its
face, the same as the type of binding judicial notice discussed in this Article: the trial
court erred by "deciding the materiality element of [the] offense itself, rather than
submitting the issue to the jury." Id. at 8.
168. Id. at 7.
169. See id. at 8 (citing examples of structural errors requiring automatic reversal).
170. Id. at 8-9.
171. The Court found that there was evidence in the record proving that Neder
failed to report over $5 million in income, and that this evidence of materiality was
overwhelming. Id. at 16. Accordingly, the error was harmless because the jury verdict

would have been the same absent the error. Id. at 16-17.
172. There is also a substantial argument that the Neder Court simply got it wrong.
See Neder, 527 U.S. at 30-40 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). Four
Justices agreed that the harmless error doctrine should not apply where the jury was
deprived of the opportunity to actually find the defendant guilty of every element of the
offense. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (joined by Justices
Souter & Ginsburg); id. at 28-30 (Stevens, J., concurring in part & concurring in the
judgment). Justice Scalia's opinion, although arguing that harmless error analysis should
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holding that the government may not direct a verdict in favor of the
prosecution.' 73 The Court distinguished Rose on the ground that the instruction
in Neder did not amount to a partial directed verdict because the jury still had the
opportunity to consider evidence presented at trial establishing materiality.
Moreover, binding judicial notice of the jurisdictional element of the
offense is, even under Neder, "so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic
reversal ... without regard to [its] effect on the outcome.'1 74 It is important to
understand what Neder actually held. The debate in Neder centered on whether
harmless error review applies when the jury could have concluded, based on
evidence in the record, that the element was proven (the majority's view) or
whether automatic reversal is required where the jury did not actually make a
determination on the omitted element (the dissent's view).' Neder therefore
actually held that harmless error review applied in that case because there was
evidence in the trial record from which the jury could have concluded that the
missing element had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Even under Neder, judicial notice of federal jurisdiction, absent a Rule
201(g) instruction, should not be subject to harmless error analysis. In such a
case, no amount of speculation regarding what the jury "could" have found will
help. The jury could not have possibly found that the evidence established the
jurisdictional element because there was no evidence in the record regarding that
element. The purpose of judicial notice is that it excuses the party with the
burden of proof on the issue from having to submit evidence to the jury proving
it. 176 Thus, even reading Neder broadly, binding judicial notice of the
jurisdictional element of the offense is "structural error" requiring automatic
reversal. Such an error defies harmless error analysis because it is not one that
can "be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in
order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.""' How could the jury have rationally reached the same conclusion
absent the error if there was no evidence from which it could have done so?'78

not be applied, stated that the error would not be reversible under the plain error doctrine,
which applies where the defendant has failed to object at trial. Id. at 34-35 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part & dissenting in part).
173. Id. at 17 n.2 ("We have no hesitation reaffirming Rose at the same time that
we subject the narrow class of cases like the present one to harmless error review.").
174. Id. at 7.
175. Id. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) ("Harmless-error
review applies only when the jury actually rendersa verdict-that is, when it has found
the defendant guilty of all the elements of the crime.") (emphasis in original).
176. See supranote 119 (stating that judicial notice relieves a party of the necessity

of submitting proof to the jury on the issue).
177. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991).
178. The question is important for appellate review. Even allowing the sort of
speculation approved in Neder about what the jury "could" have found, how can an
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Furthermore, even if binding judicial notice of an element of the offense
were subject to harmless error analysis, the error would almost never actually be
harmless. When harmless error review applies, the reviewing court must review
the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to determine whether the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'79 For the same reasons as
discussed above, binding judicial notice of the jurisdictional element would
seldom actually be harmless. Where judicial notice is taken, there simply is no
other evidence against the defendant proving thejudicially noticed element of the
offense, because judicial notice, by definition, excuses the prosecution from
presenting the relevant evidence to the jury. The only circumstance where this
type of error could be harmless is in the highly unusual case where the
government actually submitted evidence to the jury sufficient to prove the matter
beyond a reasonable doubt, but the trial court nonetheless took judicial notice
and failed to give a Rule 201(g) instruction.'
VIf.

PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION

The Sixth Amendment, Rule 201 (g) and relevant Supreme Court precedent
dictate that courts be extremely cautious when taking judicial notice in criminal
cases. This Article suggests the use of the following procedure when courts take
judicial notice of the jurisdictional element of federal criminal offenses.
First, the trial court may only take judicial notice of special territorial
jurisdiction when the prosecution presents, at a preliminary hearing held
specifically to resolve the issue, sources of reasonably unquestionable accuracy
demonstrating that the federal government properly acquired (and did not
subsequently cede) jurisdiction over the exact location of the offense. Such
sources include official, verified government maps delineating the jurisdictional
boundaries and letters ceding and accepting jurisdiction. These sources need not
be admissible in evidence.

appellate court intelligently engage in such speculation where there is no evidentiary
basis for it?
179. Neder, 527 U.S. at 7; Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.
180. Mentz provides an example of such a circumstance. In Mentz, the government
produced evidence at trial proving that the banks were FDIC-insured. See United States
v. Mentz, 840 F.2d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 1988). The Mentz court held that the presence of
evidence in the record from which the jury could have concluded that the banks were
FDIC-insured did not render the error harmless. See id. at 320 ("It is not important that
the jury might have reached a similar conclusion had it been given an opportunity to
decide the issue under a correct instruction."). Reading Neder as broadly as possible,
however, the error in Mentz could be subject to harmless error review, since the jury in
Mentz could have concluded, based on record evidence, that the banks were FDICinsured. See Neder, 527 U.S. at 16-17.
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This requirement resolves several issues. First, the risk of error is reduced
because the prosecution is required to actually submit sources establishing the
jurisdictional element. By requiring the court to hold a preliminary hearing on
the issue, this aspect of the proposal allows the court to screen out those cases
where judicial notice is not appropriate, and permits the prosecution to prepare
evidence establishing this element to present to the jury if judicial notice is
inappropriate. Furthermore, it recognizes that the proper Section of Rule 201
supporting judicial notice in this circumstance is 201(b)(2), because a federal
installation's jurisdictional status is not "generally known" to an average
layperson. Finally, this first requirement acknowledges thatjudicial notice is not
intended to be a mini-trial subject to the same limitations as trial on the merits.
Rather, the court's judicial notice can be based on sources that would not be
admissible in evidence.
Second, the sources the prosecution presents must establish to a high degree
of indisputability that the offense occurred within the federal government's
special territorial jurisdiction. If the sources submitted in support of federal
jurisdiction or material submitted in rebuttal by the defendant raise any doubts
as to the existence of special territorial jurisdiction, the trial court cannot take
judicial notice and the matter must be proven to the jury.
This element of the proposal recognizes that the normal manner of
establishing facts is through the adversary process, i.e., presentation of evidence
to the jury, cross-examination, and proof in rebuttal. The drafters of the Federal
Rules intended that judicial notice be the exception rather than the rule and that
it be used only in those cases where there is a high degree of indisputability
concerning the judicially noticed facts. When this level of certainty does not
exist, the case should revert to the normal adversary process. Thus, where the
prosecution fails to submit proper proof of the existence of the jurisdictional
element; or where the material submitted, standing alone, does not show a high
degree of indisputability; or where the defendant submits materials sufficiently
rebutting the prosecution's proof; or where the court is simply unsure of whether
the federal government enjoys jurisdiction over the area in question, the court
cannot take judicial notice.
Third, if the court can properly take judicial notice, it must separately
instruct the jury that they need not accept the court's judicial notice as binding
and that they may find that the matter has not been established beyond their own
reasonable doubt. The instruction need not follow a particular form as long as
it fairly informs the jury that the court's judicial notice is not binding.
This element of the proposal requires that federal courts actually follow
Rule 201 (g), in order to protect the accused's Sixth Amendment right to a jury
determination of all elements of the offense. In accordance with cases
addressing the issue, this aspect of the proposal recognizes that the instruction
need not track the exact language of Rule 201(g), as long as it truly conveys to
the jury that they are free to reject the court's judicial notice. It is not sufficient
that the court generally instruct the jury as to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
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To ensure that the jury appreciates that it is free to disregard the court's judicial
notice, the Rule 201(g) instruction should be given separately.
Fourth, the trial court's failure to give such an instruction should be
considered structural error requiring automatic reversal. This element is
grounded in the Supreme Court's harmless error cases. An error is only subject
to harmless error review where it can be quantitatively assessed in light of other
evidence establishing the matter. Because judicial notice in a criminal case
excuses the prosecution from presenting to the jury any evidence establishing the
matter judicially noticed, a partial directed verdict by virtue of the court's failure
to give a Rule 20 1(g) instruction cannot be so assessed. In such a case, there is
no way that the jury could have found, based on other evidence in the record,
that the matter was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an error should
therefore be the basis for reversal and a new trial.
Critics of Rule 201(g) (and the proposal above) may contend that it is a
mere technicality and a new trial should not be granted where there is substantial
evidence that the defendant is in fact guilty.' 8 ' Indeed, the Tenth Circuit in
Piggiejustified its refusal to apply Rule 201(g) by stating that "[t]he evidence
establishing guilt is not merely sufficient, it is overwhelming."' 82 In other words,
we all know the defendant is guilty; why should he be granted a new trial based
on a technicality?
While this argument admittedly carries some emotional appeal, it misses the
critical question raised in this Article. The defendant may be "guilty," but guilty
of what? The defendant, for example, may have in fact stolen the car, and may
therefore be "guilty" in the lay sense. But he is not guilty of the federal crime
specified in 18 U.S.C. Section 2119 unless the prosecution proves that the car
was stolen from an area within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United
States. 8 3 The state in which the car was stolen is capable of prosecuting this
offense, and a state jury may find the defendant guilty of a state crime that does
not include a federal jurisdictional element. The fact that the defendant may
have done the "substantive" acts that the prosecution alleges does not mean he
is guilty of the federal crime with which he was charged.
Some commentators have suggested that Congress amend Rule 201(g) to
make the court's judicial notice binding in both civil and criminal cases, for the

181. See Turner, supra note 28, at 200 (stating that such reversal is not troubling
"to those who regard the trial process as the judicial equivalent of the 'mother may I'
game-a game in which one loses if mother has not been asked for her permission to take
'two giant steps forward').
182. United States v. Piggie, 622 F.2d 486, 488 (10th Cir. 1980).
183. Cf. United States v. Prentiss, 206 F.3d 960, 969 (10th Cir. 2000) ("The
government must allege and prove [thejurisdictional element of the offense]; otherwise,
'there can be nofederal crime."') (quoting Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 381 (7th
Cir. 1999)).
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sake of jurisprudential honesty and consistency." 4 This has the advantage of
simplicity and avoids the undermining of faith in the criminal justice system that
occurs when courts manipulate and avoid legal rules they find distasteful.
Congress is of course free to amend Rule 20 1(g) to make the court's judicial
notice binding in all cases.' There is, however, a simpler way of resolving this
quandary. That is for the prosecution to introduce evidence at trial or, at a
minimum, in an abbreviated evidentiary hearing of the nature suggested above,
establishing the existence of the jurisdictional element of the charged offense.
Federal courts should not, through misapplication ofjudicial notice or over-eager
application of the harmless error doctrine, substitute their own judgment for that
of the jury.8 6 This is particularly true given Rule 201(g)'s express requirement
that federal trial courts inform the jury that they retain the responsibility to
consider whether every element of the offense has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. Federal courts may find the Sixth Amendment and' Rule
201(g) to be inefficient when it comes to jurisdictional elements of criminal
offenses. Nonetheless, the desire for efficiency should not trump the defendant's
right to jury trial.

184. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 28.

185. Eliminating Rule 201(g)'s limitation on judicial notice in criminal cases
would, however, raise substantial Sixth Amendment concerns, as discussed in this
Article.
186. As demonstrated above, routine application of the harmless error doctrine to
constitutional error encourages courts and prosecutors to undermine the right toj urytrial:
An automatic application of harmless-error review in case after case, and for
error after error, can only encourage prosecutors to subordinate the interest in
respecting the Constitution to the ever-present and always powerful interest
in obtaining a conviction in a particular case. It is particularly striking to
compare the Court's apparent willingness to forgive constitutional errors that
redound to the prosecutor's benefit with the Court's determination to give
conclusive effect to trivial errors that obstruct a defendant's ability to raise
meritorious constitutional arguments.
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 588-89 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).

